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RESPONSE TO ROBERT P. GEORGE,
NATURAL LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.*
Hearty thanks to Professor George for a sophisticated comment on
the practice of judicial review in light of natural law ethics.' In taking
as controversial a case as Griswold v. Connecticut,2 he rightly reminds
those of us who are partisans of natural law theory about its
checkered history in much the same way that Yves Simon's The
Tradition of Natural Law does when recounting the many ways that
the ideal of natural law can be used-and sometimes abusedideologically by the left and by the right in the hopes of giving the
appearance of objectivity to what is really only political willfulness.3
Whether the issue is a public matter like slavery racism, busing,
desegregation or quotas, let alone the claims about marital privacy
that came to the fore in Griswold, the possibility is enormous for one
side or the other to use the rhetoric of "natural right" or "natural law"
for something that is really a matter of political will. To put the
matter another way, not every argument that claims to be a good
natural law argument is really entitled to the natural law banner. The
trouble, of course, is: "Who's to say?" As Stephen Krason, whom
Professor George cites, likes to argue, natural law arguments depend
on careful reasoning and bringing reasonable people to see the
compelling nature of the arguments offered.- Hence there are good
natural law arguments and bad natural law arguments, but the fact
that there is disagreement should not prevent us from attempting to
make such arguments. Rather, it should challenge us to make the best
Philosophical Resource Director and Associate Professor, Department of
Philosophy, Fordham University. S.T.L., M. Div., Weston School of Theology: Ph.D.,
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case we can, mindful of the possible pitfalls.
George's reminder to us that there are competing schools of
thought about judicial review is deeply appreciated. He reviews some
of the different positions that can be taken about the legitimacy of the
practice of judicial review as well as about the proper limits of its
scope, once the practice is recognized in principle. I especially
appreciated the historical notes about the difference between those
legal traditions where judicial review has grown up in common law
practice, and those constitutions which expressly provide for a power
of judicial review, whether constituted in a limited way for the
purpose of reconciling statutory law with constitutional principles or
constituted more expansively so that a certain level of the judiciary is
invested with the power to overturn legislation that is seen to violate
natural law principles. It is my understanding that this is the situation,
for instance, in Austria today.
Clearly, Professor George's preference at the level of political
philosophy is for restricting considerations about substantive justice to
the political arena of legislation and not allowing appeals to the
natural law to enter the judicial sphere by way of a natural law
jurisprudence of judicial review. He allows for the possibility that a
constitution may make explicit provision for a judiciary to overturn
legislation on the basis of natural law considerations.
His
understandably pessimistic evaluation about the likelihood of judges
remembering to restrain their desires to put things aright, however,
leads him prudentially to prefer that this power not be explicitly
assigned to the judiciary. In this paper he claims that natural law
ethics itself does not determine where the power should be vested.
In practice, I have absolutely no disagreement with him. But I
would beg to differ with him theoretically. Let me put this as a
philosophical question about the very nature of authority in general
and about civil authority in particular. I grant that natural law allows
for quite diverse forms of government and for different ways of
vesting the various powers that properly belong to civil authorityincluding our own practice of the separation of powers into different
branches so as to prevent or minimize the abuse of power. If I have
understood him correctly, he holds that the natural law does not
decide the question of where any power of statutory review should be
located. Thus, Professor George contends that we should require an
express constitutional provision for the judiciary to use substantive
justice known by natural law as the standard for judgment; otherwise,
they should limit themselves to questions of procedural fairness.
I find it questionable to hold that there is no natural law warrant for
judges especially to employ insights about substantive questions of
justice to overturn legislation that violates natural law principles.
Authority, it seems to me, in any of its forms, is a matter of witnessing
to truths that are earlier, higher, or logically prior to itself, and using
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powers responsibly for that purpose. Civil authority will invariably
bring itself into contempt by excessively activist judicial legislation,
but civil authority can also fail by defect. It can do so, for instance in
the scenario of judges who will not assert themselves to halt injustice
that gets embodied in legislation, whether by the will of an activist
legislature or by a legislature whipped into action by a media-induced
frenzy in the populace. Indeed, such a scenario is not hard to imagine
in the recent muddle over the Electoral College and could equally be
the case, say, with regards to the natural human rights of immigrants
in an unexpected economic downturn.
Put another way, I think that we dare not restrict questions of
substantive justice known by way of natural law to the realm of
politics and legislation-we dare not do so because of what natural
law requires. We must rather insist that the natural law requires that
all three powers of government (whether these powers are separated
as in our system or combined in some other form of government)
need to call to mind and to act according to substantive justice and not
just procedural fairness. Professor George has argued that there is
nothing about the natural law that gives this role to the judicial
branch, so long as some branch of government has the role. Yet I do
not see that the natural law allows any branch (within a polity whose
powers are separated into distinct branches) to be excused from this
function.
The old adage that justice needs to be in the heart of the judge
applies not just to cases of equity (where a judge must go beyond the
letter of the law in order to bring about justice in a situation where
there would be some injustice done by strict application of the letter
of the law because legislators could not foresee all possible cases and
because their necessarily general perspective did not adequately take
into account the relevant circumstances), but also to cases where
political willfulness has brought to the fore a piece of legislation that
clearly and directly violates the principles of natural law.
Now there remains a useful distinction here between, on the one
hand, admitting that jurists may use natural law principles to overturn
legislation in the course of judicial review, and, on the other hand,
attempts at judicial legislation by any activist court. In a system with
separation of powers like our own, to refuse to the courts any lawmaking role at all is one thing, but it is quite another to recognize that
this part of the body politic bears a unique and special responsibility
for witnessing to the truths about justice and for using the powers
within its discretion to overturn legislation that violates justice.
Naturally, there will be a need for tremendous prudence and
incredible reserve to prevent judges from straying into the judicial
activism that has risked contempt, but to say that the rule of law
entails that courts have no legitimate authority to witness to truths
about substantive questions of justice strikes me as excessive. It is the
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moral virtue of restraint that they need, not the removal of
responsibility for giving witness to what authorities are supposed to
give witness in their maintenance of the common good and the rule of
law.

